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ESSAYS
TO BOLDLY GO WHERE ONLY A SELECT FEW HAVE
GONE BEFORE: EXPLORING THE COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH ACT AND THE LEGAL RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH REACHING FOR THE STARS
Brent M. Timberlake *
"Unless we turn human growth and energy toward the chal-
lenges and promises of space, our only other choice may be the aw-
ful risk, currently demonstrable, of stumbling into a cycle of fra-
tricide and regression which could end all chances of our evolving
further or of even surviving.",
I. INTRODUCTION
It was January 28, 1986; virtually every student in every class-
room was glued to the television to watch Christa McAuliffe be-
come the first teacher in space. For the first time since the Apollo
missions, the entire world seemed once again enamored with the
idea of space travel. Just over a minute after launch, the excite-
ment turned to disbelief when the space shuttle Challenger disin-
tegrated and returned to Earth.2 President Reagan was right-we
have never forgotten them "nor the last time we saw them.. . as
* Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2004, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2001, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University.
The author also serves as council member of the Transportation Law Section of the Virgin-
ia Bar Association.
1. Gene Roddenberry, Hailing Frequencies Open!, 1 THE PLANETARY REPORT 3, 3
(Apr. May 1981).
2. BBC, 1986: Seven Dead in Space Shuttle Disaster, http:/news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/
hildates/stories/january28/newsid_2506000/2506161.stm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
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they prepared for their journey and waved goodbye and slipped
the surly bonds of earth to touch the face of God." 3 The loss of
Challenger and her crew tarnished the renewed excitement in
America's space program and signaled an era of reduced notoriety
for space exploration. 4
The Russian space program's decision to offer trips into space
for private individuals in 2001 rekindled the childhood hopes and
dreams of many to travel into space.' Unfortunately, only the
wealthiest patrons of Russia's space exploration can afford the
millions of dollars it costs to take a ride into space.6
Recently, however, Virgin announced a plan that would lower
the cost and give more individuals the opportunity to travel into
space. Specifically, Virgin plans to operate a wholly private space
program in which passengers will be carried 50,000 feet into the
atmosphere by a supersonic jet and then launched into space for a
several minute tour.7 Because these flights are airplane-based,
the cost is substantially less at approximately $200,000 per per-
son per flight.8 Since Virgin's announcement, other private com-
panies throughout the world have also begun to focus on provid-
ing cheaper space flights to private persons. 9
In addition to conveyance of passengers, the use of private
commercial organizations to launch satellites and other cargo into
space opens an entirely new sector of commerce-one without li-
mitations. The expanding electronic age makes the need for new
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See BBC, 2001: First Space Tourist Blasts Off, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/
dates/stories/april/28/newsid_2501000/2501015.stm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
6. Dennis Tito, a billionaire businessman, paid $20 million for his trip to outer space.
See id.
7. See Virgin Galactic: Overview, http://virgingalactic.com/htmlsite/overview.php
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
8. See Virgin Galactic: Book, http://virgingalactic.com/htmlsitefbook.php (last visited
Oct. 11, 2009).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Alliant Techsystems, ATK Completes Successful Path-
finder for Its New Launch Vehicle (Oct. 10, 2006), http://atk.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=
118&item=626 (discussing the planned launch from Virginia's Mid-Atlantic Regional
Spaceport on Wallops Island); Blue Origin: Careers, http://blueorigin.com/index.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009) (launch facility in Texas desert); Justin Martin, Indie Space Ven-
tures Blast Off, CNN MONEY, Dec. 4, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/02/smallbusiness
/space .freight.fsb/index.htm (discussing UP Aerospace's agreement to launch from New
Mexico's future spaceport); PlanetSpace: About PlanetSpace, http:/vww.planetspace.org
lo/about.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (goal of commercialization of space).
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and more versatile satellites of even greater importance to the
world economy. Of course, the Challenger disaster has left many
companies and organizations apprehensive about the risks and
liabilities associated with space flight. Thus, not surprisingly, the
United States has lagged behind other countries in commercial
space launches over the past five years.10
II. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES
On July 28, 2008, Virgin Galactic and a vehicle development
company unveiled the carrier aircraft that will launch the subor-
bital spacecraft to the 49,000 foot ignition altitude." Another
company, Space Exploration Technologies, Inc., successfully
launched the Falcon 1 small launch vehicle on September 28,
2008, following three failed attempts. 12 Alliant Techsystems, on
the other hand, sustained a brief setback when its launch vehicle
exploded twenty-seven seconds after lifting off.'3
The United States does not have a corner on the commercial
space launch market, but ranks third behind Russia and Eu-
rope. 1'4 Revenue for commercial space flights in Russia and Eu-
rope over the last five years was just under $500 million each,
whereas revenue for the same period in the United States was
just over $125 million.' 5 While the United States was late arriving
on the commercial space flight scene, it is the nation primarily
responsible for manufacturing, developing, and exporting aero-
nautics technology around the world.1 In short, the number of
10. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., QUARTERLY LAUNCH REPORT: 4TH QUARTER 2008, at 9
(2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office-org/headquartersoffices/ast/media/4th
QtrReport.pdf.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. In the past five years, there have been twelve commercial launches in Russia,
six in Europe, and only three in the United States. Id.
16. See CARL E. BEHRENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES:
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES, COMMERCIAL COMPETITION, AND SATELLITE EXPORTS, H.R. DOC.
No. 1B93062, at 9 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/IB93062.pdf. "The
International Traffic in Arms Regulations... process has been developed under the juris-
diction of the Department of State ... and is administered by the Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls.. . ." DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION & FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., INTRODUCTION TO U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLS FOR THE COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY 3 (Oct. 2008), available at http://
www.faa.gov/about/office-org/headquarters-offices/ast/ (follow "Introduction to U.S. Ex-
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launches and revenue generated by American companies engaged
in commercial space travel is likely to grow exponentially over the
next ten years. Competition from other countries, however, will
almost certainly grow as well.
In an effort to encourage growth of the commercial space indus-
try in the United States, Congress enacted and recently amended
the Commercial Space Launch Act ("CSLA"), whereby commercial
space flights are simultaneously encouraged and regulated by the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").17 Two states-Virginia
and Florida-have also sought to encourage commercial space de-
velopment by providing income tax exemptions to companies en-
gaged in commercial space flights", and immunity for the carriage
of passengers into space. 9 All of the laws and regulations sur-
rounding commercial space flights in the United States, however,
exist within the framework created by international treaties go-
verning space exploration and travel.
III. THE BACKGROUND AND RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE CSLA
Two international treaties primarily govern space exploration
and development-the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Exploration and Use
Treaty")20 and the Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects ("Liability for Damage Treaty").2
The governing principle for all space exploration is that "[tihe
exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the
port Controls for the Commercial Space Industry" hyperlink). The ITAR regulations "sup-
port the control of items, information, or activities that could be used for threatening for-
eign military purposes, be they actual products ("defense articles"), or technical data and
support ("defense services")." Id.
17. Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118
Stat. 3974 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 70101 (2006)) [hereinafter Space Launch
Act].
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.1045 (West Cum. Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
609.3(13) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501 (West Cum. Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8
to 8.01-227.10 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
20. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Exploration and Use Treaty].
21. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability for Damage Treaty].
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benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind."22 Indeed, by international agreement,
"[o]uter space.., is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means."23 Astronauts are to be treated as the "envoys of mankind"
and countries are required to "render to them all possible assis-
tance in the event of [an] accident... or emergency ... ",24
Because space exploration and travel must be done for the ben-
efit of all mankind, each signatory country to the Exploration and
Use Treaty bears "international responsibility for national activi-
ties in outer space ... whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities ... ",25 Sig-
natory countries are also responsible for ensuring that "national
activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions" of in-
ternational law regarding space travel.26 In order to carry out this
mandate, "[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space.., shall require authorization and continuing supervision"
by the country with jurisdiction and authority over such activity.27
Signatory countries are "internationally liable for damage to
another [signatory country] or to its natural or juridical persons
by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or
in outer space," whether such activities are carried out for a pub-
lic or private purpose. 28
The liability scheme imposed upon space-faring countries is an
interesting mix between strict liability and negligence. On the
one hand, "[a] launching [country] shall be absolutely liable to
pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the
surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight."2 9 On the other hand
[iun the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth to a space object of one launching [country] or to persons
or property on board such a space object by a space object of another
22. Exploration and Use Treaty, supra note 20, at art. I.
23. Id. at art. II.
24. Id. at art. V.
25. Id. at art. VI (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at art. VII (emphasis added).
29. Liability for Damage Treaty, supra note 21, at art. II.
2009]
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launching [country], the latter shall be liable only if the damage is
due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible."
When the space objects of two or more countries are involved in
an accident or damage citizens or property of a third country, the
two launching countries are held jointly and severally liable for
the damage sustained by the third.31 The liability of those coun-
tries, however, is apportioned in accordance with the degree to
which each country was at fault.3 2 If the extent of fault of either
country cannot be established, liability is apportioned equally be-
tween them.3 3 Despite the apportionment of fault, the injured
country may "seek the entire compensation due ... from any or
all of the launching [countries] . ... ,34
As a general matter, "[w]henever two or more [countries] joint-
ly launch a space object, they shall be jointly and severally liable
for any damage caused."35 Countries that have paid damages as a
result of a launch are granted "the right to present a claim for in-
demnification to other participants in the joint launching. 3 6 Inte-
restingly, "[t]he participants in a joint launching may conclude
agreements regarding the apportioning among themselves of the
financial obligation in respect of which they are jointly and sever-
ally liable," but cannot utilize such agreements to prejudice the
rights of the injured country or its citizens. 37
The Liability for Damage Treaty does "not apply to damage
caused by a space object of a launching [country] to: (a)
[n]ationals of that launching [country]; [or] (b) [fioreign nationals
during such time as they are participating" in a launch, are close
to a launch, or are in the recovery area of a launch.3 In other
words, determining liability for Americans injured as a result of
an American-based launch, or for foreign persons who were vo-
luntarily participating in that launch, would be a matter of Amer-
ican law-the Liability for Damage Treaty would not be impli-
cated.
30. Id. at art. III.
31. Id. at art. IV(1).
32. Id. at art. IV(2).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at art. V(1).
36. Id. at art. V(2).
37. Id.
38. Id. at art. VII.
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The statute of limitations on launch-related claims is "one year
following the date of the occurrence of the damage or the identifi-
cation of the launching [country] which is liable."39 Where a coun-
try is not aware of the damage, "it may present a claim within
one year following the date on which it learned" of the damage,
but "in no event [longer than] one year following the date on
which the [country] could reasonably be expected to have learned
of the facts through the exercise of due diligence."40 The one-year
limitations period applies "even if the full extent of the damage
may not be known" by the injured country.41 Nevertheless, "the
claimant [country] shall be entitled to revise the claim and sub-
mit additional documentation after the expiration of such time-
limits until one year after the full extent of the damage is
known.",2
At first blush, it might seem as if collision of objects in space or
injury to persons or property on the ground is an infrequent oc-
currence. On February 10, 2009, however, "an Iridium commer-
cial communications satellite and the defunct Russian military
satellite Kosmos 2251 collided in low Earth orbit .... "43 The colli-
sion, which took place over Siberia, created a large dust cloud and
was monitored to ensure that other objects in orbit-including the
International Space Station-were not in danger. 44 As more and
more companies and nations engage in space exploration, there
will undoubtedly be more and more collisions and accidents in
space.
Given the international obligations imposed upon the United
States government, Congress passed the CSLA to promote pri-
vate space flight while simultaneously seeking to minimize the
risk to the public and the liability of the federal government gen-
erally.4, The FAA, more specifically, the Office of Commercial
39. Id. at art. X(1).
40. Id. at art. X(2). For general tort practitioners, this is essentially an application of
the "discovery rule" for purpose of accrual of the statute of limitations. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1979).
41. Liability for Damage Treaty, supra note 21, at art. X(3).
42. Id.
43. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., QUARTERLY LAUNCH REPORT: 2ND QUARTER 2009, at 3
(2009), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office-org/headquarters-offices/ast/media/2Q
2009%20Quarterly%20Report.pdf.
44. Id.
45. See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)-(b) (2006).
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Space Transportation, is tasked with overseeing the implementa-
tion of the CSLA.
4
6
IV. THE GENERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE CSLA
The CSLA governs the sites from which commercial rockets are
launched into space, the launch of reusable launch vehicles
("RLVs"), the launch of non-reusable vehicles, the reentry of reen-
try vehicles other than RLVs, and sites at which a reentry is to
occur.
47
The CSLA regulates two types of space flights-those in which
RLVs are used and those in which expendable vehicles are used.4 8
The CSLA prohibits the use of either type of vehicle unless a li-
cense is obtained from the FAA. 9 Operators of RLVs can obtain
either a "mission-specific" license, which approves a certain num-
ber of specifically delineated missions from a specific launch site,
or a two-year "operator license," which permits the launching and
reentry of a specific type of RLV at locations and within parame-
ters set forth in the license itself.50 Similarly, operators of ex-
pendable rockets can obtain one of two types of licenses: a
"launch-specific" license, which explicitly approves a certain
number of specifically delineated missions from a launch site, or a
five-year "launch operator" license, which permits an operator to
launch rockets of the same type from a single launch site within a
given set of parameters set forth in the license.51
A. License and Licensing Requirements
To obtain a license of either type, an applicant must consult
with the FAA prior to submitting an application 52 and must comp-
46. See Fed. Aviation Admin., About the Office, http://www.faa.gov/abouttoffice-org/
headquarters-offices/ast/about] (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
47. 14 C.F.R. § 413.1 (2009).
48. Compare 14 C.F.R. § 415 (2009) (setting forth licensing requirements for launch
vehicles other than RLVs), with 14 C.F.R. § 431 (2009) (setting forth licensing require-
ments for RLVs).
49. See 49 U.S.C. § 70104(a) (2006); see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 415.31, 431.3 (2009).
50. 14 C.F.R. § 431.3(a)-(b) (2009).
51. Id. § 415.3.
52. Id. § 413.5. Consultation must also occur before any safety approval application is
made. Id. § 414.9.
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ly with the FAA's general licensing regulations." In addition, an
applicant must obtain safety approvals from the FAA for the fol-
lowing: "(1) [1]aunch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system,
process, service, or any identified component thereof; [and] (2)
[qlualified and trained personnel, performing a process or func-
tion related to licensed launch activities or vehicles."54 A "safety
approval" is a determination by the FAA that the reviewed
items-when used in accordance with design specifications or
within defined parameters-"will not jeopardize public health
and safety or safety of property." 5 Safety approvals can be ob-
tained by manufacturers or designers of launch vehicles or a
component thereof, personnel who perform critical safety func-
tions, or designers and developers of safety systems or processes."
The FAA mandates, however, that "[a] safety approval applicant
must have sufficient knowledge and expertise to show that the
design and operation of the safety element for which safety ap-
proval is sought qualify for a safety approval."57
An application for safety approval must include the following
technical information:
(i) Information and analyses.., demonstrating safe performance of
the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engi-
neering design and analyses that show the adequacy of the proposed
safety element for its intended use, such that the use in a licensed
launch or reentry will not jeopardize public health or safety or the
safety of property. (iii) Relevant manufacturing processes. (iv) Test
and evaluation procedures. (v) Test results. (vi) Maintenance proce-
dures. (vii) Personnel qualifications and training procedures.5"
Understanding that the technical requirements might involve the
submission of trade secrets or other confidential information, the
FAA maintains the confidentiality of any such information, pro-
vided that that the submissions are each specifically marked as
confidential. 59
In determining whether to issue a safety approval, the FAA
will look to the following hierarchy of authority: "(1) FAA or other
53. See id. § 413.1-413.23.
54. Id. § 414.3
55. Id.
56. Id. § 414.7(b).
57. Id. § 414.7(c).
58. Id. § 414.11(c)(3)(i)-(vii).
59. Id. § 414.13(a)(2), (b).
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appropriate Federal regulations[;] (2) Government-developed or
adopted standards[;] (3) Industry consensus performance-based
criteria or standards[; or] (4) Applicant-developed criteria."60
When an applicant submits its own criteria, it must also submit
information that would enable the FAA to fully evaluate the me-
rits and viability of the safety design.6' Specifically, a company
seeking to use its own criteria must submit for dissemination to
the public as part of the approval process the following informa-
tion: "(i) Design and minimum performance; (ii) Quality assur-
ance system requirements; (iii) Production acceptance test speci-
fications; and (iv) Continued operational safety monitoring
system characteristics."62 If approved, the safety approval is valid
for five years, and can be used in support of applications for
launch licenses.63
As discussed previously, licenses can be obtained for either
RLVs or expendable vehicles.64 No license can be granted unless
all policy 65 and safety approvals have been obtained from the
FAA.6 In addition, the FAA reviews the application to determine
whether the applicant is capable of launching the vehicle-and
returning the vehicle to the earth in the case of RLVs-"without
jeopardizing public health and safety and safety of property."7
It would not be possible to recount the exact scientific formulae
or criteria used by the FAA to make safety determinations for li-
cense applicants in this article because they are quite involved
60. Id. § 414.19(a)(1)-(4).
61. Id. § 414.19(a)(4).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 414.21(d). Even after a safety approval is granted, the applicant is under a
continued obligation to maintain the accuracy of the information in the original applica-
tion and to supplement the application with new information as it becomes available. Id. §
414.23. In addition, safety approvals can be renewed within ninety days of their expira-
tion, provided that the renewal application meets all of the requirements for obtaining ap-
proval of an original application. Id. § 414.27. Safety approvals can only be transferred to
other entities with FAA approval. Id. § 414.29(a).
64. See id. §§ 413.1-431.93 (RLVs); id. §§ 415.1-415.203 (expendable vehicles).
65. See id. § 415.23(a) (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.23(a) (RLVs). A policy review is
conducted for any mission license or nonexpendable vehicle application to determine
whether the proposed activity presents any issues that would adversely affect the United
States' national security, foreign policy interests, or would jeopardize public health and
safety. Id. § 415.23(a) (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.23(a) (RLVs). Policy reviews are per-
formed in conjunction with other agencies of the federal government. See id. § 415.23(b)
(expendable vehicles); id. § 431.23(b) (RLVs).
66. Id. § 415.5 (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.5 (RLVs).
67. Id. § 415.31(a) (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.31 (RLVs).
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and complex. Generally speaking, however, the FAA looks at the
specific launch characteristics, including the type of launch, popu-
lation centers, and other data to determine whether the proposed
launch represents an "acceptable risk."6 Further, launch opera-
tors are required to demonstrate that they have the following me-
chanisms and procedures in place: (1) mission readiness proce-
dures, 69 (2) communications plans, 0 (3) "[rleusable launch vehicle
mission operational requirements and restrictions,"71 (4) accident
or mishap investigation plans, 72 and (5) other varying require-
ments.
7 3
B. Experimental Permits
It may be difficult for launch operators to meet all of the safety
approval and policy approval processes without first conducting
experiments on launch vehicles. As a result, the CSLA provides
for the issuance of experimental permits.74 Experimental permits
are available for an unlimited number of experimental flights us-
ing a particular design for a reusable suborbital rocket.75 Further,
experimental permits can only be obtained for research and de-
velopment, showing compliance with FAA requirements as part of
a license application, or crew training.7 6 Although a permit holder
can launch people into space, the permit holder cannot accept
compensation for that activity while operating under an experi-
mental permit 77 and is not "relieve[d] ... of its obligation to comp-
ly with any requirement of law that applies to its activities. 78 Fi-
nally, permits are valid for only one year and can be renewed, but
cannot be transferred to any other party.7 9
68. Id. § 415.35 (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.35 (RLVs).
69. Id. § 415.37(a) (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.37 (RLVs).
70. Id. § 415.37(b) (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.41 (RLVs).
71. Id. § 431.43 (RLVs).
72. Id. § 415.41 (expendable vehicles); id. § 431.45 (RLVs).
73. See, e.g., id. § 431.39(a) (RLVs).
74. See 49 U.S.C. § 70105a (2006).
75. Id. § 70105a(e)(1).
76. Id. § 70105a(d).
77. Id. § 70105a(h).
78. 14 C.F.R. § 437.17 (2009).
79. Id. § 437.11; id. § 437.15.
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C. Government Inspections and Financial Responsibility
Requirements
All permit or license applicants must submit to government in-
spections, which include inspections of their contractors' and sub-
contractors' facilities, as a condition of licensing or permitting.80
These inspections can be conducted at the launch or reentry site,
at construction facilities, at manufacturing plants, or at any loca-
tion that is associated with the launch or the design or manufac-
turing of components for use in the launch or reentry.8 Inspec-
tions are conducted at times and locations selected by the FAA.8 1
As part of the safety review and inspection process, described
supra Part IV(A)-(B), the FAA makes a determination of the
maximum probable loss associated with the launch activity. 3 The
maximum probable loss8 becomes an integral part of the CSLA's
liability-shifting provisions and the requirement that applicants
demonstrate adequate financial responsibility to cover the maxi-
mum probable loss.8 5
V. THE LIABILITY-SHIFTING PROVISIONS OF THE CSLA
The CSLA requires all license or permit applicants to demon-
strate financial responsibility-whether through liability insur-
ance or some independent means of guaranteeing payment in the
event of loss-to compensate "(A) a third party for death, bodily
injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity car-
ried out under the license; and (B) the United States Government
against a person for damage or loss to Government property re-
sulting from an activity carried out under the license."8
80. See 49 U.S.C. § 70106(a) (2006).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The maximum probable loss determination is discussed in more detail infra Part
V.
85. See 49 U.S.C. § 70112 (2006).
86. Id. § 70112(a)(A)-(B). The FAA is required, as part of any application process, to
assess the maximum probable loss--"the greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or
property damage that is reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activi-
ty." 14 C.F.R. § 440.3 (2009). The FAA determines the minimum amount of loss through a
thorough review of all of the scientific and technical data regarding the spaceflights, and
utilizes that data to come up with the maximum probable loss figure. See id. § 440.7. For a
[Vol. 44:81
SPACE LAUNCH ACT
A "third party" does not include any of the following entities
and personnel while involved in launch or reentry activities: the
United States or any of its contractors or subcontractors; licen-
sees or permittees or any of their contractors or subcontractors;
customers of licensees or permittees, or any of the customer's con-
tractors or subcontractors; or space flight participants.8 7 The
terms "contractors" and "subcontractors" are broadly defined as
"those entities that are involved at any level, directly or indirect-
ly, in licensed or permitted activities, and includes suppliers of
property and services, and the component manufacturers of a
launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, or payload."-
As part of every license or permit application, the FAA makes a
determination of the maximum probable loss, which constitutes
the basis for the financial requirements set forth in the licensing
and permitting regulations.8 9 In making its determination, the
FAA requires applicants to submit a plethora of information re-
garding the mission, including persons involved, governmental
personnel involved, and payload so that it can assess the risks as-
sociated with the proposed activity.90 After receiving this informa-
tion, the FAA "will consult with Federal agencies that are in-
volved in, or whose personnel or property are exposed to risk of
damage or loss as a result of, a licensed or permitted activity" in
order to determine the maximum probable loss.91 The determina-
tion must be made "no later than ninety days after a licensee or
permittee has requested a determination and submitted all in-
formation required by the FAA to make the determination."92 Ap-
plicants are required to update information regarding the pro-
posed activity as it changes, and the FAA can amend its
maximum probable loss determination as warranted by the sup-
plemental information received. 93
discussion of all of the data considered by the FAA, see Appendix A to Part 440.
87. 14 C.F.R. § 440.3 (2009). Coincidentally, government employees are included in
the definition of a third party, and thus any insurance contract must cover injuries or
damage sustained by government employees. See id. §§ 440.3, 440.5.
88. Id. § 440.3.
89. Id. § 440.7(a).
90. See id. § 440.7; id. § 400 app. A.
91. Id. § 440.7(b).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 440.7(c)-(d).
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A licensee or permittee is required to obtain sufficient insur-
ance to cover the maximum probable loss, 94 but in no event is the
insurance required to be for more than $500 million to cover
claims by third parties, and $100 million to cover property dam-
age claims by the United States.95 In addition, the insurance poli-
cy must provide coverage for "(A) the Government[;] (B) executive
agencies and personnel, contractors, and subcontractors of the
Government[;] (C) contractors, subcontractors, and customers of
the licensee or transferee[; and] (D) contractors and subcontrac-
tors of the customer"9 6 "to the extent of their potential liability for
involvement in launch services." 97
In addition, the licensee or permittee is required to "make a re-
ciprocal waiver of claims with its contractors, subcontractors, and
customers, and contractors and subcontractors of the customers,
involved in launch services or reentry services."9s The reciprocal
waivers require all of the parties to the waiver agreement "to be
responsible for property damage or loss it sustains, or for person-
al injury to, death of, or property damage or loss sustained by its
own employees resulting from an activity carried out under the
applicable license [or permit]." 99 The United States government
and its agencies-but not its employees-agreed to make a simi-
lar waiver with the licensee or permittee and all contractors, sub-
contractors, and customers of the licensee or permittee. 1°0
Where third-party claims against the licensee or its contractors
or subcontractors-or the employees of any of them-arising out
of a licensed activity exceeds the maximum probable loss or $500
million, whichever is less, the United States will pay "successful
covered claims (including reasonable expenses of litigation or set-
94. Id. § 440.9. The insurance policy must comply with certain conditions. Id. §
440.13. An applicant can also demonstrate financial responsibility through means other
than insurance, but the regulations are silent as to what would constitute a sufficient
demonstration of "financial responsibility" to comply with the CSLA. See id.
95. 49 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(3)(A) (2006). In the event the maximum insurance available
in the world market is less than $500 million or $100 million, licensees and permittees are
only obligated to obtain the maximum insurance available on the world market. Id. §
70112(a)(3)(B).
96. Id. § 70112(a)(4).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 70112(b)(1).
99. Id. The regulations also require that the waiver contain an indemnification clause
and a "hold harmless" provision for employee claims. See 14 C.F.R. § 440.17(b) (2009).
100. 49 U.S.C. § 70112(b)(2) (2006); see also 14 C.F.R. § 440.3 (2009); supra text accom-
panying note 80.
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tlement)" up to $1.5 billion but only "to the extent provided in an
appropriation [bill]."'
In other words, payment by the United States is conditioned
upon congressional earmarking of funds to cover the payment,
notice of the claim, and numerous other requirements. 10 2 Once an
amount for a licensed activity exceeds $1.5 billion, however, the
licensee is responsible for payment of the overage. 103
Interestingly, the CSLA and federal regulations draw a distinc-
tion between a licensee and a permittee regarding whether the
licensee or permittee remains liable for amounts exceeding the
coverage of the federally mandated insurance. Put simply, the
agreement of the United States to accept liability for successful
claims above the limits of any federally mandated insurance and
below $1.5 billion, applies "to a license issued or transferred...
for which the Secretary [of Transportation] receives a complete
and valid application not later than December 31, 2009... [but]
does not apply to permits. ' 9104
Accordingly, companies involved in private space flights under-
taken pursuant to experimental permits will be protected against
claims by third parties for personal injury or property damage
and by the United States for property damage, but only to the ex-
tent of insurance required by the FAA. Where a claim exceeds
that amount, however, the permitted company and its contractors
and subcontractors must look to their own resources to satisfy
any claim or judgment. The reciprocal waivers and releases re-
quired by the CSLA still provide protection from claims by those
persons covered by the releases-i.e., everyone but third parties
and employees of the United States government-even for
amounts exceeding $1.5 billion.
VI. THE WAIVER PROVISIONS OF THE CSLA
Neither the CSLA nor the regulations promulgated thereunder
require space flight participants to execute waivers in favor of the
101. 14 C.F.R. § 440.19(a)(1)-(2) (2009); see also 49 U.S.C. § 70113(a)(2) (2006) (stating
that willful misconduct by the licensee is not covered).
102. 14 C.F.R. § 440.19(e) (2009).
103. Id. § 440.5(c). As previously discussed, this is because employees of the United
States government are treated as third parties under the CSLA. See id. § 440.3.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 70113(f) (2006).
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licensee or permittee or its contractors and subcontractors.105
Space flight participants are, however, required to execute a valid
and mutual waiver with the United States government. 10 6 Licen-
sees and permittees are required to provide disclosures regarding
the safety history and risks associated with space travel to partic-
ipants,1"7 and they must receive training on safety issues, includ-
ing how to respond to emergency situations while in flight. 10
Because the CSLA does not require space flight participants to
waive liability for any entity other than the United States gov-
ernment, companies participating in manned space flights will
still need to look to other means of limiting claims by space flight
participants. 109
VII. WHAT WAIVERS WILL WORK?
A. Viability of Releases Generally
The viability of a release for personal injuries sustained by a
surviving space flight participant will be measured according to
the applicable state's public policies regarding releases of future
negligence, as well as the degree to which wrongful death actions
are believed to be derivative of the decedent's claims. Some states
permit such releases, while others do not."0 Most of the decisions
105. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.41-460.53 (2009).
106. Id. § 460.49.
107. Id. § 460.45.
108. Id. § 460.51.
109. This is undoubtedly why other states have passed legislation which seeks to limit
the liability of licensees/permittees and their contractors and subcontractors to space
flight participants. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8 to 8.01-227.10 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
110. Compare Gambino v. Music Television, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (finding that a release agreement for an obstacle course that required the plaintiff to
assume all risks, including falls, was valid and granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant), Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 735-36, 739 (D. Haw. 1993)
(upholding a release signed by the plaintiff who was killed as a result of canopy line break-
ing while paragliding, finding that that release was unambiguous and made clear that the
plaintiff assumed all risks of paragliding, including death), Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 826 (Ct. App. 1996) (upholding summary judgment in favor of a ski
company where the plaintiff signed a release acknowledging the dangers associated with
skiing prior to going on the slopes), Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 302,
304, 307 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a release executed by the deceased plaintiff who was
left alone by his scuba-diving instructor, finding that the release stated in bold type that it
released the defendant from "liability for personal injury, property damage or wrongful
death caused by negligence" making clear that the plaintiff assumed the risks of the dive),
Powers v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. Rptr. 55, 57 (Ct. App. 1987) (upholding two separate
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striking down releases utilize the unfairness, unequal bargaining
position, or general ambiguity of the release as a basis for finding
the release unenforceable."'
Notwithstanding the public policies of states regarding waivers
and releases, however, the federal government has made a policy
determination that such releases are proper and enforceable for
all space-flight participants. Specifically, the United States re-
quires that every space-flight participant execute a release excus-
ing it from liability, and further mandates the use of a specific
form included in the Code of Federal Regulations. 12 This form re-
releases signed by the plaintiff as part of his rental of an ultralight aircraft, and conclud-
ing that the releases were "clearly written, easily legible, and specifically phrased"), Heil
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) (upholding a release where
the plaintiff was injured as a result of a horse falling on her, finding that the agreement
was written in clear and unambiguous terms and the plaintiff was aware of the risks),
Jones v. Dressel, 582 P.2d 1057, 1058-59 (Colo. App. 1978) (upholding a release of a para-
chute jumper for injuries incurred during an airplane crash, finding that there was no real
unequal bargaining power and plaintiff could have sought the services elsewhere), Deboer
v. Fla. Offroaders Driver's Ass'n, 622 So. 2d 1134, 1135-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding a release signed by a racing spectator, when she was struck and killed by a
race car while walking across the track), Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533
N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting that the plaintiffs signature on an agreement
that he released the parachute school from "any and all liability claims, demands, or caus-
es of action whatsoever arising out of any damages, loss or injury," was sufficient to defeat
plaintiffs estate's negligence claim), Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392
N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the release language was sufficient to
release the skydiving company from liability for negligence), and Moss v. Fortune, 340
S.W.2d 902, 903-04 (Tenn. 1960) (upholding a release for injuries sustained by plaintiff
while horseback riding, finding that the plaintiff was aware of the dangers when he signed
the release and therefore could not escape his own agreement), with Frank v. Mathews,
136 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the form release, which merely re-
cited a statute regarding assuming the risk of equine activities, was not sufficiently clear
to indicate a clear and unmistakable waiver and shifting of the risk), and Mettler v. Nellis,
695 N.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the release void as against public
policy for overbreadth because the release agreement was not limited to the plaintiffs ac-
tivity of horseback riding, but rather sought to release the defendant from "any liability or
responsibility for any damage, injury, or illness").
111. See Reuther v. S. Cross Club, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (find-
ing that a release agreement's listing of the dangers associated with scuba diving was not
sufficient to release the defendant from injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a
wave striking the boat in which he was riding on the way to the scuba dive); Sirek v. Fair-
field Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the release
agreement proffered by a ski rental shop was not sufficiently clear to alert the plaintiff
that it was seeking to release the shop from liability for the negligence of its employees as
opposed to defects in the equipment); Conteh v. Majestic Farms, 739 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729
(App. Div. 2002) (finding that the release did not clearly and unequivocally release the
horseback facility operators from their own negligent acts and therefore was unenforcea-
ble in plaintiffs suit); Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 244 Va. 191, 195, 418 S.E.2d
894, 896 (1992) (finding that "liability for personal injury which may be caused by future
acts of negligence are prohibited 'universally'").
112. 14 C.F.R. § 460.49 (2009); see also id. § 440 app. E.
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leases the federal government from any liability associated with
space flight-regardless of fault.113 The FAA's use of form lan-
guage arguably suggests that the FAA believes the language used
therein is sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to
understand and appreciate its terms. The release also signals a
policy determination by the United States that participants can
waive liability for space flight.
It is difficult to imagine a court upholding the language of the
federal government's release but denying the validity of a release
for a company involved in launches or reentries that contain the
same language. As a result, releases associated with commercial
space flights that model those used by the federal government are
more likely to be upheld.114
B. Releases in the Wrongful Death Context
Where a participant dies, most wrongful death statutes provide
a participant's heirs with a cause of action for the participant's
death, as well as for recovery for solace and any loss of consor-
tium (if recognized) that is sustained by the participant's family.
The question in those cases is whether a release by a participant
is sufficient to defeat the claims of his/her heirs under a given
state's wrongful death statute.
As a general matter, a "majority of the state courts ... have
held that a survivor cannot bring a wrongful death action if the
decedent was barred from doing so in his lifetime, because the
wrongful death claim is essentially derivative of the injury to the
decedent."' Specifically, '[a] judgment for or against the dece-
dent in an action for his injuries commenced during his lifetime,
113. Id. § 440 app. E.
114. A court could conclude that the federal release merely relates the ability of the
sovereign to control and govern its own responsibility and liability, and thus has no bear-
ing on private agreements pertaining to allocation of liability or assumption of risk. Such a
conclusion, however, ignores the very essence of the CSLA, which seeks to minimize the
risk of all parties associated with a commercial space launch, and thereby promote addi-
tional research and a proliferation of corporate interest in commercial space flights. See
infra Part VII.
115. Schwarder v. United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984)) ("The wrongful death action for the
benefit of survivors is, like other actions based on injuries to others, derivative in nature,
arising out of and dependent upon the wrong done to the injured person and thus barred
when his claim would be barred." (footnotes omitted)).
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or the compromise and release of such an action, will operate as a
bar to any subsequent suit founded upon his death.'"'16 Interes-
tingly, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the same
rationale in cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability
Act ("FELA"), but not in cases involving seamen injured on U.S.
territorial waters. 117
Many courts have concluded that a waiver of liability by a de-
cedent precludes litigation by his/her heirs."8 California and at
least four other states, however, "have adopted a rule that per-
mits survivors to maintain a cause of action for wrongful death,
notwithstanding the fact that the decedent, or his or her estate
settled the claim against the tortfeasor."11 9 In striking down the
116. Id. at 1129 (quoting KEETON, supra note 115, § 121); see also Walrod v. S. Pac. Co.,
447 F.2d 930, 955 (9th Cir. 1971); Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co.,
225 F. 441, 443 (W.D. Wash. 1915); Woodward Iron Co. v. Craig, 53 So. 2d 586, 593 (Ala.
1951); Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Abbott, 705 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ark. 1986); Kling v. Torello,
87 A. 987, 988 (Conn. 1913); Perry v. Philadelphia, Balt. & Wash. R.R. Co., 77 A. 725, 734-
35 (Del. Super. Ct. 1910); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla.
1983); Fountas v. Breed, 455 N.E.2d 200, 204-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Perry's Adm'r v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 251 S.W. 202, 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923); Harris v. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co., 71 So. 878, 878-79 (Miss. 1916); Schmelzer v. Cent. Furniture Co., 158
S.W. 353, 354-55 (Mo. 1913); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 187 N.W. 806, 808
(Neb. 1922); Kelliher v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 824, 825-26 (N.Y.
1914); Edwards v. Interstate Chem. Corp., 87 S.E. 635, 636 (N.C. 1916); Haws v. Luethje,
503 P.2d 871, 875 (Okla. 1972); Price v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 12 S.E. 413, 413-14 (S.C.
1890); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Hengst, 81 S.W. 832, 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Legg v.
Britton, 24 A. 1016, 1017 (Vt. 1892); Va. Elect. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 159, 3
S.E.2d 172, 173-74 (Va. 1939); Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1971).
117. Compare Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 344 (1928) ("By the overwhelming
weight of judicial authority, where a statute of the nature of Lord Campbell's Act in effect
gives a right to recover damages for the benefit of dependents, the remedy depends upon
the existence in the decedent at the time of his death of a right of action to recover for such
injury. A settlement by the wrongdoer with the injured person [under the FELA], in the
absence of fraud or mistake, precludes any remedy by the personal representative based
upon the same wrongful act."), with Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579,
583 (1974) (adopting minority rule for cases involving seamen injured in territorial wa-
ters).
118. See, e.g., Grbac v. Reading Fair Co., 688 F.2d 215, 216-17 (3d Cir. 1982) (uphold-
ing release against the decedent's widow and minor children because "it was not against
public policy" and holding that "a release which is valid against the decedent does bar a
wrongful death action"); Milne v. USA Cycling Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1289-90 (D.
Utah 2007) (upholding release of liability for negligence on the basis that "while an action
for wrongful death is an independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased[, it] is
based on the underlying wrong done to the decedent." (quoting Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc.,
944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997)); Booth v. Bowen, No. 2006-217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78721, at *10-11 (D.V.I. Oct. 18, 2007) ("The Court is mindful that the Virgin Islands
wrongful death statute was designed to give heirs the right to recover for their pecuniary
losses caused by their decedent's death. That policy is not in conflict with the strong public
policy reasons for holding parties to their written word." (citations omitted)).
119. Schwarder, 974 F.2d at 1130; see also Blackwell v. Am. Film Co., 209 P. 999, 1001
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portion of an agreement by the decedent waiving the claims of his
heirs and personal representatives, however, the California Court
of Appeals drew a distinction between waiving a wrongful death
action and assuming the risks of an activity. 10
Specifically, the court noted that because the heirs had a sepa-
rate and distinct claim under California's wrongful death statute,
the decedent "had no power or right to waive that cause of action
on behalf of his heirs."12 Nevertheless, the court also noted that
"a plaintiff in a wrongful death action is subject to any defenses
which could have been asserted against the decedent, including
an express agreement by the decedent to waive the defendant's
negligence and assume all risks."22 As a result, the court drew a
distinction between "the legal ineffectiveness of a decedent's pre-
injury release of his heirs's subsequent wrongful death action and
the legal effectiveness of an express release of negligence by a de-
cedent which provides a defendant with 'a complete defense."23
The court thus concluded that the heirs's wrongful death claim
was barred because the decedent had contractually assumed all of
the risks associated with his actions.2 4
Accordingly, releases asking the participant to assume the
risks associated with space flight stand a better chance of defeat-
ing the claims of heirs, assigns, and representatives in a later
wrongful death suit. The question ultimately becomes whether
state and federal public policy should permit such assumption of
risk contracts to defeat a claim for injuries or death related to the
space-flight activity. As discussed previously, the answer varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 25
(Cal. 1922); Goodyear v. Davis, 220 P. 282, 285-86 (Kan. 1923); Alfone v. Sarno, 432 A.2d
857, 865 (N.J. 1981); De Hart v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 85 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ohio Ct. App.
1948); Rowe v. Richards, 151 N.W. 1001, 1003-04 (S.D. 1915).
120. Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303-04 (Ct. App. 1988).
121. Id. at 303.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 303-04 (quoting Scroggs v. Coast Cmty. College Dist., 239 Cal. Rptr. 916,
918 (Ct. App. 1987)).
124. Id. at 307.
125. As long as a choice of law agreement specifically indicates an intent to apply a cer-
tain state's law in a tort case, some states hold such agreements to be enforceable. See,
e.g., Spectrum Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Int'l, LLC, No. SA-05-CV-750-XR, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10603, at *175-78 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008) (finding that a choice of law
provision in a contract, if worded properly and broadly enough, would cover tort claims as
well); see also Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d
Cir. 1983) (finding that tort claims were governed by forum selection clause because such
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C. Does the Federal Policy Regarding Releases by Space Flight
Participants Preempt State Law or Policies to the Contrary?
The CSLA makes clear that where a state's law conflicts with
the requirements of the FAA or the federal government, the
state's laws must give way to the CSLA (or regulations promul-
gated there under) pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 126 Specifically, the CSLA provides
that "[a] State or political subdivision of a State... may adopt or
have in effect a law, regulation, standard, or order consistent
with [the CSLAI that is in addition to or more stringent than a
requirement of, or regulation prescribed under" the CSLA. 127
Historically, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to preempt
state laws or regulations with federal law absent a clear and ma-
nifest intent on the part of Congress to displace state authority
over the regulated area.128 Congressional intent to preempt state
authority can be expressed in the statute itself, or implied by the
scope or coverage of the federal legislation.29 Even when the goal
claims arose from the existence of the contractual relationship-the contract was "the ba-
sic source of any [tort] duty"); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Centimark Corp., No.
2:04-cv-0916, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35611, at *7 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2005) (holding that
the forum selection clause covered "any dispute," including plaintiffs negligence claims,
because "[tlhe word 'any' is all-encompassing language, indicating the parties' belief that
all actions regarding their relationship will be governed by the forum selection clause").
126. See 49 U.S.C. § 70117(c) (2006).
127. Id. (emphasis added). The italicized language is relevant because many similar
provisions under federal law only discuss "state" action, and have been held by courts to
not extend to political subdivisions of a state. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Tulla-
homa, 705 F. Supp. 385, 387 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) ("§ 205 of the FRSA does not permit an ex-
ception to preemption where a municipality acts by ordinance to regulate an 'essentially
local' railroad safety hazard. The plain language of the statute itself indicates that it ap-
plies only to states."); Johnson v. S. Ry. Co., 654 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. N.C. 1987) (con-
cluding that the exception listed in 49 U.S.C. § 20106 only permits states-not municipali-
ties-to set more stringent speed limits for trains, and that even if the municipality had
such authority, there was nothing in the law indicating that any assessment of the local
hazard was conducted).
128. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption
cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated... in a field which the
States have traditionally occupied,'.., we 'start with the assumption that the historic po-
lice powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal legislation] unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
129. Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992) (finding
that all state regulation of warnings on cigarette packaging-including those alleged in
common law failure-to-warn claims-were preempted by the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2006)), with Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (finding that the enforcement of a state statute regarding the labeling
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of preemption is not specifically expressed by Congress, federal
requirements may still preempt state action in three circums-
tances: (1) where the federal and state laws are in actual conflict;
(2) where the federal regulation is so expansive and exhaustive
that it leaves no room for state supplementation of federal law; or
(3) where the state regulation, policy, or rule stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishments of a federal policy or goal.130
The CSLA does not expressly address the validity of releases
and waivers of liability between space flight participants and li-
censees or permittees. Nevertheless, the refusal of a state to rec-
ognize the validity of a form release or waiver between a space
flight participant and a licensee or permittee may obstruct the
full purposes and objectives of the CSLA.1'3 For example, in Geier
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether a state common-law suit could be brought
against Honda Motor Company, Inc. ("Honda") for failing to in-
clude passive restraints when Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards did not require such restraints in all vehicles.1 2 Inte-
restingly, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act had an express
preemption clause, but also contained a savings provision indicat-
ing that "'[ciompliance with' a federal safety standard 'does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law.' ' 33 As a
result, the Supreme Court's analysis focused on whether state
common law suits, claiming that additional standards were re-
quired, conflicted with the federal standards such that the com-
mon law suits were preempted under the Supremacy Clause. 134
The Court noted that the Department of Transportation's
("DOT") decision not to require passive restraints in all vehicles
reflected a conscious balancing of the alternatives and risks in an
of flour was preempted because of its interference with the goal of the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2006)).
130. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (find-
ing that where compliance with state and federal law is impossible, state law is
preempted); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (finding that state law will be preempted where federal
regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it"); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (finding
that state law is preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
131. See generally Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
132. 529 U.S. 861, 864-65 (2000).
133. Id. at 867-68.
134. See id. at 869-72.
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effort to promote safety in passenger automobiles.135 The Court
concluded that Geier's claim was premised upon a duty on the
part of Honda to install passive restraints in the car he pur-
chased, and the same state rule of law "would have required
manufactures of all similar cars to install airbags rather than
other passive restraint systems ... -136 Accordingly, the common-
law suit alleging negligence on the part of Honda "stood 'as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of' the important
means-related federal objectives" articulated by the Secretary of
Transportation. 3 7 The Court even indicated that it "place[d] some
weight upon DOT's interpretation of [the federal safety stan-
dards'] objectives and its conclusion... that a tort suit such as
this one would 'stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution' of those objectives."138
Given that Congress's goal for the CSLA is to promote space
flight and permit parties to contractually limit their statutory
liability,'39 the argument in Geier could be used to claim that any
state law or prohibition on the release of such claims obstructs
Congress's goal to promote this particular means of space explo-
ration.4 0 Because the very essence of the CSLA is the minimiza-
tion and reallocation of financial responsibility so as to encourage
135. See id. at 877-81. The Court further noted that "DOT now tells us through the
Solicitor General, the 1984 version of the [safety standards] 'embodies the Secretary's poli-
cy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative pro-
tection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car."' Id. at 881
(quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 25, Geier
v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811)).
136. Id. at 881.
137. Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
138. Id. at 883 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Af-
firmance, supra note 135, at 26).
139. Space Launch Act, supra note 17, at § 2.
140. Such an argument does not appear to be hindered by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Wyeth v. Levine finding that no preemption existed. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129
S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (rejecting Wyeth's claims that FDA regulations in effect operated
to preempt state law failure-to-warn claims). The Court in Wyeth noted, however, that
"the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.'" Id. at
1194 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Further, "[in all pre-
emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied .... we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Id. at 1194-95 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). Put simply, space has never been an area
of law that states have traditionally regulated, and thus federal goals regarding space
launch and reentry activities would seem paramount.
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more private participation in space exploration and commerce,'
a state law that effectively prevents a private company from ob-
taining an effective waiver certainly frustrates congressional in-
tent. This position would be strengthened in those instances
where permittees and licensees use the same form release for
space flight participants that is used to release claims by the fed-
eral government.
VIII. STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCHES
Interestingly, the Commonwealth of Virginia has led the nation
in passing legislation encouraging companies to engage in com-
mercial space launches within its borders. Specifically, Virginia
passed the Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act of 2007,142
which "effectively made Virginia the most progressive state in the
country in addressing the challenge that existing tort law posed
to emerging human spaceflight transportation companies."141 The
Act provides immunity for "a participant injury resulting from
the risks of space flight activities, provided that the participant
has been informed of the risks of space flight activities as re-
quired by federal law .... ."144 Where the statutorily mandated
warnings are provided, the Act gives civil immunity to space
flight entities, which include "any manufacturer or supplier of
components, services, or vehicles that have been reviewed by the
United States Federal Aviation Administration as part of issuing
such a license, permit, or authorization."145 Although the Act does
not cover gross negligence or willful misconduct, it covers all oth-
er types of negligence actions .146
Virginia also enacted the Zero G Zero Tax Act of 2008, which
"provide[s] an exemption from state income taxes to any space
141. Space Launch Act, supra note 17, at § 2.
142. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch.893, 2007 Va. Acts 2430, 2430-31 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8 to 8.01-227.10 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
143. See QUARTERLY LAUNCH REPORT: 4TH QUARTER 2008, supra note 10, at SR-2.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
145. Id. §§ 8.01-227.8 to 8.01-227.9 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
146. Id. § 8.01-227.9 (Repl. Vol. 2007). Virginia arguably needed to pass the legislation
because its public policy prohibits releases of future negligence, and only the General As-
sembly could modify the public policy against such releases. See Estes Express Lines, Inc.
v. Chopper Express, Inc., 273 Va. 358, 365, 641 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2007) (citing Hiett v.
Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 244 Va. 191, 194-95, 418 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1992)).
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transportation company doing business in Virginia with the in-
tent either to launch payloads from the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Spaceport (MARS) or conduct spaceflight training.1 47 In addition,
the exemption from income tax is not affected by the "failure,
postponement or cancellation of a launch of any orbital or subor-
bital space facility, space propulsion system, space vehicle, satel-
lite or space station of any kind or the destruction of any launch
vehicle or any components thereof."148
Virginia's interest in space exploration and encouraging space
commerce is not a recent development. In 1995, the General As-
sembly passed the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority
Act ("VCSFAA"), which established Virginia's Commercial Space
Flight Authority ("VCSFA").19 In short, the "General Assem-
bly.., determined that there exists in the Commonwealth a need
to (i) disseminate knowledge pertaining to scientific and technol-
ogical research and development among public and private enti-
ties, including but not limited to knowledge in the area of com-
mercial space flight, and (ii) promote industrial and economic
development. '150 The Board of Directors of the VCSFA has thir-
teen members in total, comprised as follows:
the President of the Center for Innovative Technology, the President
of Old Dominion University, the Secretary of Commerce and Trade,
and the Secretary of Technology... four members representing the
commercial space flight industry; two members representing the tel-
ecommunications industry; one member representing the County of
Accomack; one member representing the County of Northampton,
and one at-large member. 5 '
The VCSFAA gives the Board of Directors considerable authority
to act as an independent body, but its primary purpose is to util-
ize funds-public and private-to encourage and promote com-
mercial space participation in Virginia.1 52 The MARS facility on
the eastern shore and Virginia's quick response to the CSLA are a
147. See QUARTERLY LAUNCH REPORT: 4TH QUARTER 2008, supra note 10, at SR-2 (cit-
ing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3(13) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3(13) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
149. Act of Apr. 6, 1995, ch. 758, 1995 Va. Acts 1312, 1313 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-266.1 to 9-266.19 (Cum. Supp. 1995)). The VCSSFAA is currently located in title 2.2
of the Virginia Code. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-2201, 2.2-2202, 2.2-2204 to 2.2-2217 (Repl.
Vol. 2008); id. § 2.2-2203 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2202 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
151. Id. § 2.2-2203 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
152. See id. §§ 2.2-2201, 2.2-2202, 2.2-2204 to 2.2-2217 (Repl. Vol. 2008); id. § 2.2-2203
(Cum. Supp. 2009).
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testament to the commitment of Virginia and the VCSFA to ad-
vancing commercial space participation in the Commonwealth.
Following Virginia's lead, the state of Florida passed the
Informed Consent for Spaceflight Act in 2008, which similarly
provides immunity for companies engaged in commercial space
flight.153 Florida also passed the Qualified Spaceflight Contractor
Tax Refund Act, which allows space flight contractors to receive
refunds-based upon new jobs and wages paid to employees-
after entering into agreements with the state of Florida.54
The FAA expressed that the actions of Virginia and Florida
"took other states, and much of the industry, by surprise given
the speed with which [they were] accomplished." 155 As a result,
the FAA believes that it is "likely that other states will pass simi-
lar legislation in the years ahead."116
IX. CONCLUSION
As populations continue to expand and natural resources con-
tinue to wane, the need for expansion beyond the confines of our
planet becomes even more important. Just as an infant wobbles
taking her first steps, so too must mankind wobble its way into
safe and economically feasible space travel. As a society, and as a
species, we now stand at the precipice of a new era of explora-
tion-one that has great risk but also promises great reward.
The CSLA and the statutory regimes created by Virginia and
Florida provide some comfort and assurance to those willing to
boldly go where only a select few have gone before. As the market
for development and procurement of space travel expands, the
United States and other jurisdictions will likely continue to pro-
vide similar protections for private companies wishing to take the
chance on what might be. Although there is risk, the payoff and
profits associated with reaching for the stars will likely drive the
next generation of explorers and entrepreneurs into space-just
as they drove our ancestors to cross mountain ranges, traverse
deserts, and set sail in wooden ships for distant shores.
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501 (West Cum. Supp. 2009).
154. Id. § 288.1045 (West Cum. Supp. 2009).
155. QUARTERLY LAUNCH REPORT: 4TH QUARTER 2008, supra note 10, at SR-3.
156. Id.
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